Turkey, far away," as a metonym for torments that barbarians inflict on each other, in which "we" are happily not involved, might be invoked (not always approvingly) by anyone from Catholic journalists to Marxist revolutionaries to Wilhelmine aristocrats. 2 Recently, it has embellished the press conference of a German foreign minister, the sermon of a bishop, the arguments of Germany's Muslims: it is part of the cultural repertoire of every German with a high school education. 3 Yet Goethe's lines clearly meant not to recommend but to satirize the philistinism of his countrymen, so insulated behind their town walls that the horrors on Europe's periphery became mere titillation for comfortable Spießbürger, armchair strategists enjoying their frisson of horror (and superiority) on a sunny afternoon. Goethe's insight-how distance destroys fellow feeling-was not, of course, unique. In 1759, Adam Smith had noted wryly that a man who knew that he was "to lose his little finger tomorrow, . . . would not sleep tonight. But, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren." 4 And just six years before Faust, Chateaubriand had offered a chilling variation on the same theme in the form of a thought experiment that became known, after Balzac recycled it in Père Goriot in 1835, as the Chinese Mandarin Question. The question was this: What would you do if you could inherit a fortune, without leaving home and without risk of punishment or even discovery, simply by willing the death "of an old Chinese mandarin"? Though Chateaubriand had raised the question in order to insist that conscience would, in the end, prevail, Balzac's character replies, "Oh, I'm on my thirty-third mandarin." 5 The enormous difficulty of establishing a moral connection, a sense of obligation, toward someone you can't see-indeed, never will see-is a universal one. It is the greatest obstacle that faces any NGO-Doctors without Borders, Amnesty International, and countless others-that tries to mobilize support to address what Thomas Laqueur calls "distant suffering." Even those who are neither as insouciant as Goethe's ordinary Germans nor as callous as Balzac's Bianchon, those who feel genuine dismay at hearing others' bad news, are unlikely to exert themselves in any sustained way. Our common humanity does not, in practice, compel action. As Hannah Arendt concluded upon surveying the plight of displaced persons after the world wars: "It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow man." 6 What does it take to pry open the circle of obligation, to admit as "fellows" those whose suffering is out of sight? "Love thy neighbor!" is a commandment embedded in many religious traditions. Yet since biblical times it has elicited the evasive response, "Who is my neighbor?" The answer to that question, so vital to humanitarians, presupposes an answer to yet another: "Who am I?" And both have historically been conditioned by our answers to yet a third: "Who is not my neighbor?"-in academic parlance, "Who is the 'Other'?" "Brotherhood entails Otherhood," it has been said. 7 They are two sides of the same coin. And which side is up helps explain the differential success, or failure, of human rights activists then and now.
In recent years we have come to see both identity and alterity as deeply implicated in something that Edward Said has taught us to call "Orientalism," a discourse that invents and exalts a Western Self by contrasting it to an essentialized Islamic Other. My essay puts pressure on Said's dichotomies. It takes as its starting point one of the West's earliest and most universal movements to address distant suffering, a movement occasioned by the massacre, beginning in 1894 and continuing for more than two years, of some 200,000 or more Armenians in the Ottoman Empire of Abdul Hamid II. 8 In the epoch inaugurated by these pogroms, "down in Turkey, far away" ceased to be a metonym and became the actual site of pain. After a brief survey of countries where Armenian human rights (as they were called even then) attracted significant political support, I will turn to Wilhelmine Germany, where activists had a notably thin time of it. 9 Many of the groups that elsewhere took up the Armenian cause were here pulled by countervailing interests. In Germany, moreover, the very discourse employed on behalf of Armenians was turned against them, and a counterdiscourse, one we might well term Orientalist, was deployed against an Armenian Other in order to champion their Muslim antagonists. Thus, to an extent that undercuts simple notions of Orientalism, German spokesmen succeeded in diluting sympathy for the victims and shifting it to the perpetrators. After offering some hypotheses to explain why German responses took this exceptional turn, I will conclude with more general reflections provoked by these responses to the Armenian-Turkish conflict: on the inevitable weakness of the category "human"; on the kaleidoscopic nature of "right here" and "far away"; and on the permeable boundaries of Germany's (and our) "Europe" and "Orient."
I. GEOPOLITICS AND ARMENOPHILE NARRATIVES
No one, let us stipulate, who works for another's human rights has ever been satisfied with the public's response, and those engaged on behalf of the Armenians were no exception. The English Quaker J. Rendell Harris was "tempted to despair." 10 Prime Minister Salisbury, who labored mightily to build a united front among the Great Powers to put pressure on Abdul Hamid, exclaimed after months of fruitless negotiations that he did not believe that, outside England, "from Archangel to Cadiz there is a soul who cares whether the Armenians are exterminated preface (entitled "A Later Note," xix), for a total of ca. 100,000. These did not include those who died later from wounds, exposure, or loss of breadwinner. By 1903, French and Italian commentators were putting the number of victims at 300,000. Pour l'Arménie et la Macédoine (Paris, 1904) , vii, 64, 142, 184-85, 250-53. As in most mass killings, authoritative figures are unavailable. 9 The term "human rights" used by Social Democrats: "Erklärung," Vorwärts, no. 265, Nov. 11, 1896; by Catholics: "Die Protestversammlung gegen die türkischen Greuel in Armenien," Germania, no. 226, Sept. 30, 1896, 2. Blatt; and by Liberals: Friedrich Naumann, "Zur Armenierfrage," Die christliche Welt (hereafter ChW) 12, no. 50, Dec. 15, 1898, cols. 1185-88, esp. 1187, and "Asia": Eine Orientreise über Athen, Konstantinopel, Baalbek, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Kairo, Neapel, 5th printing (Berlin-Schoneberg, 1904), 138. Thanks to Chris Nickerson for copies of Germania and other papers from 1895-97. Although one can distinguish humanitarian from human rights activism, in the case of minority populations the two tend to bleed into each other, the food, shelter, and medical care emphasized by the former often being dependent upon basic political protections demanded by the latter. Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878 -1938 (Cambridge, 2004 , does not include Armenians. 10 Harris to Johannes Lepsius, Dec. 22, 1896, in Lepsius, Armenia and Europe, x.
or not." France's ambassador to Constantinople, Paul Cambon, who shared Salisbury's horror at the massacres, seconded the complaint.
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"We see the world through the stories we tell," notes Mark Danner. That is, we make sense of information we acquire only incrementally "by placing it in a context we have already constructed."
12 To move the public from the default mode depicted in Faust, from its traditional suspicion that the mass killings "down in Turkey, far away" were simply one more round in an eternal cycle of violencewith no right, no wrong, no end, and therefore no meaning-required spokesmen who could fit Armenians and Turks into a narrative in which listeners could imagine themselves. Eventually, Armenia's advocates succeeded in supplying such narratives, generating when they did so broad public backing. In Switzerland, activists performed this feat by figuring the Armenians as another "small mountain people," one whose survival over the centuries, in the face of large and powerful neighbors, was testimony to their grit. In 1896, the Swiss collected a million francs for Armenian relief and more signatures of support than on any petition in their history. 13 To the English-speaking world, the Armenians were outposts of Western enlightenment in the Ottoman Empire. The Liberal warhorse William Ewart Gladstone proclaimed that "to serve Armenia is to serve civilization," a line quoted in New York on the masthead of Armenia, a monthly. Just as in Britain the Armenian cause attracted Liberals, in the United States its activists-Julia Ward Howe, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Jacob Schiff come to mind-typified those strata most invested in the progressive narrative. In all three countries a genuine mass movement, one that crossed political and religious lines, was mobilized behind the Armenian cause. 16 That Armenians no longer constituted a majority in historic Armenia (not least thanks to the massacres that had reduced and dispersed them, but also, after 1912-13, because of the influx of hundreds of thousands of Balkan Muslims, expelled during the First and Second Balkan Wars) was a negligible difficulty for a public long used to writing off the Ottoman Empire as an anachronism, and for whom Turks, Kurds, Circassians, and the other Muslims populating eastern Anatolia were shadowy presences, claiming attention only when they were killing Christians.
In Germany, however, a narrative favorable to the Armenians did not succeed in crowding out alternatives. Their cause, as the same Polish socialist noted, failed to attract the Left, whose press often treated reports of massacres with skepticism. German comrades had their own story line, one that told them that they did not have a dog in this fight. As late as October 1915, after learning that some 800,000 Armenians had been slaughtered over the previous six months, the Social Democratic editor Max Grunwald could argue that "in judging [the Armenian situation] one must observe Marx's guiding principle that historical development moves according to its own laws. If one wanted to apply European concepts of morality and politics to Turkish conditions, one would arrive at a completely distorted judgment."
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The dismissal of "European concepts of morality" as inapplicable to Turkey was not confined to the followers of Marx. The liberal orientalist C. H. Becker, founder of the journal Der Islam and later minister of culture in the Weimar Republic, invoked the same argument after he learned the "horrifying details" of the fate of the Armenians from former students stationed in Anatolia during the war: "Never forget that in Turkey we do not have a Rechtsstaat with an educated population and effective state authority; we stand here, rather, on Asiatic soil, where European culture and the discipline of a European state are only slowly 16 The argument from cultural relativism continues to be the indispensable apology for murderous regimes. Whether and when it will be employed, however, depends upon whose culture is being relativized-and on preferences growing out of narratives more geopolitical than developmental. Thus, in 1896 when the twenty-five-year-old Rosa Luxemburg, then a student in Zurich, submitted a three-part article to Vorwärts, Social Democracy's premier daily, demanding that the party "declare itself without reserve for the Armenian cause," its editor, Wilhelm Liebknecht, rejected it, invoking not Marx's theory of historical development but a narrative with an even older pedigree on the German Left. 19 The Grand Old Man of German Social Democracy, who had won his spurs in the 1848 revolution and cofounded the Second International, sympathized with all repressed humans, classes, and peoples, he averred. But Liebknecht, alert to the tsarist threat, wanted the young lady to get her priorities straight: "Fräulein Rosa Luxenburg"-Liebknecht managed to misspell Luxemburg's name three different ways in the same piece-"who is, after all, a Pole, would perhaps find a more fruitful field if she occupied herself with the Russian atrocities in Poland, and in Russia itself. Then she would not run the danger of unintentionally serving the interests of the bulwark of European absolutism." 20 Given these priorities, Vorwärts was not being inconsistent when, after violence erupted between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in the Caucasus in 1905, it published an Armenian appeal that accused tsarist forces of deliberately arming the 18 An analogous geopolitical narrative-this time with England rather than Russia as the villain-was invoked by Germany's Liberals in dismissing demands that the Reich exert pressure on behalf of Armenians. Employing the same "objectively/subjectively" distinction beloved of Marxist casuists, a popular Left Liberal leader argued at his party's national congress in 1899 that "a position friendly to Armenians . . . means, in reality, supporting-however little one might intend it-England's expansionist politics." 22 He was not alone in suspecting the Armenians of being-objectively, of course-allies of England. The Liberal press buzzed with such extenuations. And Hellmut von Gerlach, a scion of Junker aristocrats who would spend much of his life recycling in various autobiographies the heroic story of his journey from "Right to Left," dutifully registering (in 1937) his revulsion at the carnage that confronted him on a trip to Constantinople in 1896, argued in 1898 at a Left Liberal Party congress against taking any position on the Armenians, those clients of England. Like many who hankered after a greater German role in Asia Minor, Gerlach preferred instead a policy toward Turkey that "improves the lot of our own people." 23 Analogous considerations, buttressed by his own futuristic narrative, inspired Theodor Herzl's enthusiastic response ("excellent!") to an overture in 1896 by an agent of Abdul Hamid II suggesting that he marshal "Jewish power" on the sultan's behalf, especially in the Armenian matter. 24 In a year when European sympathy for the Armenians was at its height and pressure on the Ottoman padishah was intense, Herzl used all his contacts, as Zionist leader and as newspaperman, to turn the tide. He began at the top, with a scheme to persuade Lord Salisbury to compel the Armenians to accept a reconciliation with the sultan on the latter's terms. As an Austrian, he also tried to influence his own foreign minister. 25 second prong of his attack was an approach to Armenian exile leaders, whom he hoped to shepherd "back into the [Ottoman] pen." An Armenian insurrection was rumored for July, and the sultan wanted Herzl to get them to "submit without condition," after which he would spontaneously grant all the reforms he deemed "possible." 26 Herzl sent a secret emissary to meet with Armenian committees in Paris, Brussels, and London. He personally sought out the founder of the revolutionary Hintschaks in London and conferred with a Tbilisi Armenian leader in Vienna. A permanent peace was not part of the agenda. Herzl was acutely conscious that his leverage with the sultan would evaporate once Armenians ceased to be a threat, while Abdul Hamid himself wanted an armistice only to buy time to marshal his forces. All was very hugger-mugger: "Under no circumstances are the Armenians to learn that we want to use them in order to erect a Jewish state." 27 But the wary Armenians kept Herzl at arm's length.
Less fanciful were Herzl's efforts to influence the press. Abdul Hamid's precondition for the audience that the Zionist leader wanted to jump-start his Palestine project was Herzl's success in persuading newspapers "in London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna to treat the Armenian question in a manner more friendly to the Turks." Herzl declared himself ready "à me mettre en campagne." Proposing to "create an atmosphere" receptive to the "submission of the Armenians," he promised not only to contact journalists throughout Europe but also to produce a series of articles in Vienna's leading daily, his own Neue Freie Presse, on his favorable impressions of Constantinople's ruling circles. A puff piece appeared the next day. Herzl gave interviews to the correspondents of Novosti and other Russian papers, to Israel Zangwill for the Sunday Times, and to Lucien Wolf, foreign affairs editor of the Daily Graphic. 28 The latter nearly blew Herzl's cover by asking about a rumor that the sultan was angling for Jewish support against the Armenians in return for benevolence toward Herzl's plans for Palestine. The "new Moses" indignantly denied it. 29 Herzl continued to treat Wolf as a co-conspirator, asking on July 10, 1896: "Is the Thus at the very time that England, France, and Russia were pressing Abdul Hamid to accept reforms, Herzl offered him a way out via "our [i.e., Jewish] power." How? "The sultan gives us the piece of land, and for that we will put everything in order for him, regulate his finances, and determine public opinion of the entire world in his favor." 30 Herzl had already taken the Ottoman debt to heart. By enlisting "our money people," he proposed to get rid of the "shaming" European Control Commission and turn interest payments on the Ottoman debt over to a Jewish directorate, who would enable the sultan to borrow "ad libitum." Various Rothschilds (Edmund James and Nathanial Meyer) were approached, as were Claude Montefiore and Sir Samuel Montagu. A loan of 2 million pounds sterling, supplemented by yearly increments of 1 million, leading to a total credit of 20 million was mentioned. But talk's cheap. And in the midst of all of it came new "horror stories." Fresh massacres, this time in Constantinople before the eyes of European diplomats and businessmen, were the sultan's retaliation for the seizure of the Ottoman Bank by Armenian revolutionaries. "The impression on the world is deplorable," Herzl admitted. The financiers on whom he had pinned his hopes, "the Englishman Montagu, etc.," would probably refuse anything connected with Abdul Hamid. "On the other hand, though," he noted brightly, "it would be a very favorable moment to negotiate with the sultan, because he will be hard put to get money from anyone now."
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Herzl did not lack information about what was going down in Turkey, far away. During his interview with the grand vizier, their interpreter had offered "pleasantly" (apparently in response to Herzl's alarmed query about a massacre in Van) that "it was nothing-only a couple of hundred deaths." That fall, Herzl heard a detailed account of the Constantinople bloodbath from an eyewitness.
32 But geopolitics remained trumps. In 1901, it dictated a flattering telegram wired to the sultan by the Fifth Zionist Congress in Basel, only three months after fresh pogroms in Sasun and Mush. 33 The gesture outraged Armenian students in Geneva and Lausanne, as well as their Bulgarian, Polish, Russian, Macedonian, Georgian, and Jewish classmates, who telegraphed their indignation to Herzl. The protests were then published in Paris's Pro Arménia. The Fifth Zionist Congress's telegram excited the particular ire of Bernard Lazare. Himself once a Zionist, Lazare was scandalized that no one in Basel had objected to this salute to a "sultan covered with the blood of others." 34 Although embarrassing, for Herzl the flap was not without its consolations: "This may do me good with the sultan," he noted. 35 The young Chaim Weizmann, leader of the Zionists' Democratic Faction, which counted Martin Buber, now a Berliner and one of the delegates to Basel, among its members, hastened to organize rallies to denounce the anti-Herzl outcry as dishonoring the Jewish people. The declarations in Pro Arménia against the Zionist Congress's telegram were reprinted in Genveaux, the journal of the Genevan Radical Party. Weizmann's counterattack was published in Leopold Sonnemann's left liberal Frankfurter Zeitung, one of the most influential papers in Germany, thus ensuring its publicity among an important sector of the German public.
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It is difficult to gauge how far Herzl's exertions affected (or reflected) opinion in Germany. Herzl's Neue Freie Presse was a feeder journal for much of the German-language press, especially on matters Ottoman, since it was one of the few papers to have its own correspondent in the Turkish capital. Even the Catholic press relied on "the great Viennese Jewish paper" for much of its news of the Orient. 37 Yet reporting on Ottoman matters from the Neue Freie Press was mixed (the sultan himself had complained of it), and Zionism had captured the allegiance of a relatively small number of German-speaking Jews. Nevertheless, the contrast between Jewish spokesmen in France, Britain, and the United States, including those sympathetic to Zionism, and their Central European counterparts is striking. 38 The former were noticeably engaged in Armenian human rights, while two of Herzl's earliest German associates, Davis Trietsch and Dr. Alfred Nossigalthough they eventually broke with him on the ways and means of colonizing Palestine-would also employ their talents in the Turkish cause. 39 Nossig went I am not suggesting that no one within these milieus-German-speaking Zionists, Social Democratic editors, Liberal scholars, journalists, and politiciansfelt a twinge of compassion when they heard of mass murder down in Turkey far away. Luxemburg and Bernstein are evidence to the contrary. But as a group, Germans on the Left responded differently from their counterparts abroad. Later, I will try to explain the German difference. For now, it is enough to note that they were all answering the Chinese Mandarin Question (let us now rename it the Armenian Peasant Question) in the manner not of Chateaubriand but of Balzac.
The Armenians found only one constituency in Germany willing to provide them with sustained publicity and succor. These were Christians-but Christians of a particular kind. Catholics kept a low profile. Their national bishops' conference did institute a nationwide collection, and a Cologne rally, graced by two bishops and three leaders of the Center Party, attracted a crowd of several thousand. Catholic newspapers usually reported Armenian suffering sympathetically and tended (unlike much of the German press) to relay official Ottoman accounts with caution. But the tone was sober, and solutions, if any, were left to the British. 42 As for the papers of the mainstream Protestant church, their reporting initially reflected shifting points of view and degrees of engagement. Christliche Welt, published by the liberal theologian Martin Rade, did consistently champion the victims, but its subscribers were relatively few. 43 Its 5,000 subscriptions circulated widely, however, via reading groups. Axel Meißner, "Martin Rades 'Christliche Welt' und Armenien: Bausteine für eine internationale politis-The core constituency for Armenian human rights lay elsewhere, with people whom Germans loosely call "awakened" (and Americans, even more loosely, "fundamentalists"): men and women whose religious sensibility and belief in the verbal inspiration of the Bible put them closer to the Anglo-American holiness movement that later fed into pentacostalism than to their contemporaries within the Wilhelmine Protestant establishment, ecclesiastical and academic.
44 Not a few were millenarians, and thus part of a broader international Protestant impulse, connected to each other and committed to evangelizing activity-from street preaching in Copenhagen to mission stations in India-in anticipation of the Second Coming. 45 Such were the foot soldiers of the movement for Armenian relief in Germany: the men and women who organized rallies, who took up collections for clinics and orphanages (amassing well over 600,000 marks by January 1897), who "adopted" children and paid the salaries of doctors and nurses. 46 They were to be found in churches as often as auditoriums, their ushers wearing the red armbands of the YMCA, their meetings opening with a hymn, closing with a prayer. Their publications reached broad audiences: Auf der Warte, for example, claimed an astonishing 50,000 subscribers. These were the people who brought events in Anatolia to the attention of the mainstream Protestant religious press, which eventually joined the cause.
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While most Germans had difficulty discerning the story into which Turks and Armenians fit, evangelicals had no trouble making sense of what they heard, slotting these new horrors into traditional Christian narratives of suffering: Armenians, whose nation was the first to choose Christ (301 CE), were martyrs; Abdul Hamid II was a new Diocletian, a second Nero. 48 Especially for Germans living near Berlin, the incendiary Nero was a vivid figure. During the 1880s a popular panorama depicting the Roman emperor's human torches, wrapped like mummies in pitch, had kept crowds aghast. 49 The immolation of so many Armenians inside their churches made the parallel seem self-evident, as did reports of crucifixions.
Christians knew that the faithful might be called on to make the ultimate sacrifice, and the nineteenth century had driven the point home, with the deaths of 40,000 Vietnamese Catholics in the 1880s and 350,000 Chinese Christians in the Taiping civil war. 50 The mass "conversions" to Islam at sword's point in the pogrom-swept villages of Anatolia underlined the message that these "brothers and sisters" were victims of religious persecution. 51 On remedies, opinion was divided. One pastor alluded enviously to the spirit of the Crusades; another expressed the hope that the sultan's attempt to drive Christians from Turkish soil would end with the Turks being driven out of Europe; still others rejected any action except prayer as encroaching on the prerogatives of the Almighty. None had any doubt, however, that there was meaning in the Armenian agony. As Pastor Johannes Lepsius, the charismatic leader of the movement, assured his audience, "The frightful suffering of a Christian people is itself a sign that the day is not far off when the reign of Christianity will begin. those of other persuasions. Indeed, it opened a door through which turcophile writers launched their own campaign, one that did not scruple to set armenophile narratives boldly on their head. To reports of slaughtered Armenians, naysayers served up a narrative of Muslim tolerance. To depictions of Ottoman corruption and backwardness, they touted the sultan's reforms-a trope that after the regime change of 1908 morphed into Young Turk "modernity." They countered demands for self-determination by damning the Armenians as agents of imperialism: cat'spaws for France, Russia, and especially England, whose tears for Armenians, ignoring Muslim victims of Christian brutality, revealed Albion's typically selfserving double standard. First off the mark was the journalist Hans Barth, with an over-the-top lampoon of the Armenian rights movement that appeared in Die Zukunft, a weekly journal of opinion whose satirical sparkle made it must reading for all sophisticated Germans with claims to being in the know. Entitled "Turk Baiting," and soon expanded into a book, Turk, Defend Yourself! Barth's piece rang the changes on a turcophile narrative that would persist in Germany for at least two decades. 53 Barth's great insight was to recognize that in responding to faraway events, people brought their identities (and alterities) with them. Thus he opened with a full-bore attack on the armenophiles themselves. His theme? Those Christians are at it again! The same crowd who gave us the sack of Constantinople in 1204, the Spanish Inquisition, the conquistadors, Cesare Borgia, the Puritans and British hypocrisy (with their offshoots, General Booth and his ridiculous Salvation Army)-plus today's atrocities in the Philippines and the Congo: these folks are now whipping up another "crusade"-this time against Islam.
Logically, Barth's diatribe left everything to be desired. What Lepsius's pious Protestants, who hated the pope almost as much as the devil, had to do with the Spanish Inquisition (for example) was anybody's guess. Tactically, however, it was brilliant. The topoi of the Christian fanatic, the pious Tartuffe, the meddling "missionaries" tapped into one of the most deeply felt issues of the day, Germany's long-running culture wars, the acrimonious quarrel between religion and secular modernity. Playing upon progressive Germany's allergic reaction to the specter of "clerical politics," Barth's identification of the campaign for Armenian human rights as a "crusade," with a genealogy reaching back to the twelfth century, was designed to make it easy for the very stratum that in other countries joined the churches in pressing for international intervention to hesitate in Germany, for fear of being manipulated for unsavory clerical ends. 54 Even more 53 "Die Türkenhetze," Die Zukunft 5, no. 16 (Jan. 16, 1897), 130-32; Türke, Wehre Dich! 2nd printing (Leipzig, 1898).
54 "Die achte Kreuzzug," the title of part 1 of Barth's book, punned on the archaic spelling for echt (genuine) and conventions in German historiography that numbered medieval Crusades at seven, encouraging an eschatological and numerological tradition that suggested that eight (achte) would bring a final, apocalyptic victory. Thanks to Geoffrey Koziol for this information. After the war, "Der achte Kreuzzug" was the title of lectures to raise money for Armenian relief sponsored by Lepsius Easy to make, the insinuation was difficult to disprove. But in fact the missionary movement whose organizations provided the delivery system for Armenian relief has recently been credited with having offered Germany's most vigorous opposition to the new political antisemitism. Familiarity with Hebrew texts led its theologians to attack charges of ritual murder leveled against Jews as ignorant nonsense; a proselytizing agenda encouraged closer contacts with real Jews and, ultimately, what one historian has described as genuine "philosemitism."
55 Missionaries pinned eschatological hopes on the success of Zionism, greeting the twenty-two new agricultural colonies in Palestine as a "miracle" that signaled the fulfillment of scripture-an interpretation Herzl himself was pleased to exploit. 56 Lepsius, who welcomed Zionism both because it was the precondition for the conversion of Israel prophesied by Paul and because the Jewish people had a legitimate right to a national existence, immediately and credibly rejected the slur of antisemitism. 57 Nevertheless, however contrived it was for Barth to reduce the Protestant establishment to (in Lepsius's rebuke) "a society of antisemites," it is unlikely that the communities who supplied the heart and muscle of the armenophile movement were exempt from the negative assumptions about Jews so common in contem- 58 Moreover, although the journalist did not mention him by name, many readers would have been aware that among those "dear pastors" on whom Barth dripped his sarcasm was the former court preacher Adolf Stoecker, famous to contemporaries and historians as the founder of the antisemitic Christian Social movement. At a time when much of the conservative press, anticipating the wishes of the Foreign Office, was finding excuses for the Armenian massacres, or ignoring them, it was Stoecker who stuck his neck out by running articles in his Deutsche Evangelische Kirchenzeitung on the killings. In 1897, he stood up in Prussia's House of Deputies and demanded that the interior minister explain why he had put the kibosh on church collections for Armenian relief and deported refugee speakers. More noteworthy, however, than the advocacy of Stoecker (a man whose day had passed) should have been the fact-as a pastor on the pacifist Left pointed out-that no other deputy, in any of Germany's parliaments, including the Reichstag, had had the gumption to pose the same awkward questions.
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Unremarked by Barth, but even more compromising, was the presence of Paul Förster on the podium at a mass rally for Armenians, sitting alongside two of the most respected officials of the Protestant church. A man of no known religious convictions, today Förster is remembered mainly, if he is remembered at all, as the brother of Bernhard Förster, Wagnerian racial enthusiast, author of the antisemitic petition of 1881, founder of the Neu-Germania settlement in Paraguay, and husband of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Like his brother, Paul Förster was a lifelong swimmer in the sea of Germany's antisemitic parties and organizations and at the time of the rally was representing one of them in the Reichstag. Reichstag deputy, he was probably there for decoration, speaking roles being confined to Lepsius and another parson. Anyone who has ever been mortified during a political demonstration by the slogan on the T-shirt of a fellow marcher may be reluctant as I to convict the armenophiles of guilt by association. Nevertheless, someone must have invited the man, and Förster's presence on that Berlin podium was bound to cast a damning shadow on the clerical worthies at his side and on the cause they held dear. 61 Barth did not rest with guilt by association. Contrasted with the specter of reactionary Christian fanaticism was its mirror opposite and Barth's second theme: Progressive Turkey, or, as the inviting title of the second half of his book put it, "The Turks as Kulturvolk." Chapters on Turkey's "National Awakening," on Abdul Hamid's "Reforms," on "The Modern Turkish Woman" hammered the message home: modernity was on the march-especially in Turkey. 62 Except for Barth's extravagant praise of the sultan, all these tropes would appear again and again in the German press over the next decades: the Turkish national "Renaissance"; the commitment to modernity, with reforms inspired by German thinkers (Friedrich List) and German advisors (Generals Helmut von Moltke and Colmar von der Goltz); and-much beloved by encomiasts, European and Turkish alike-the new Turkish woman. (They don't need a woman's movement to deal with prostitution, illegitimacy, low wages, etc., because Turkish women don't become prostitutes and unwed mothers and Turkish wives don't work outside the home-though younger women are already claiming their right to discard the veil.) I call them tropes because they were never altered by anything new, least of all by new information. 63 The linchpin of the turcophile counternarrative, joining its two parts-invective against the Christians and praise for the Turks-appeared in the title of Barth's central chapter: "A People of Tolerance." The gist? When Christians had been busy setting folks on fire, the Turks were the ones who in 1492 took in the Jews.
"Tolerance" was the trope that trumped all tropes. References to 1492 occurred 61 The other speaker was Wilhelm Faber, a student of Franz Delitzsch, founder of Leipzig's Institutum Judaicum. A man of a thousand enthusiasms, including the conversion of Jewry, Faber may have been the one who invited Förster, since it is impossible to imagine Lepsius recruiting the man. A revealing sketch of Faber, with whom Lepsius eventually broke: Meißner, "Martin Rades 'Christliche Welt,'" 167 n. 588. 62 Barth, Türke, 198, 265. 63 The "new woman" and her emancipation became a staple of turcophile propaganda. as regularly in turcophile journalism as invocations of the Declaration of Independence on the Fourth of July. 64 When Eduard Bernstein addressed a rally of workers in 1902 on behalf of the Armenians, he acknowledged the difficulties the tolerance narrative posed for those trying to mobilize opinion to put pressure on the Porte. In words that might have surprised Edward Said, Bernstein declared that a "great prejudice reigns here in Europe in favor of Mohammedanism. Out of opposition to what we have seen of Christianity in the course of history," and by comparing its deeds with certain events in Islamic lands, Europeans had "drawn the conclusion that Mohammedanism has better precepts than Christianity and, all things considered, is superior." 65 Bernstein was alluding to the nineteenth century's idealized picture-propagated by romantics from Victor Hugo to Washington Irving-of a tolerant, pluralist, Islamic Spain that Ferdinand and Isabella had brought to a tragic end. 66 Bernstein had no difficulty refuting the notion that Turkish "tolerance" was what Europeans meant by the term, nor in demonstrating the irrelevance of the virtues of medieval Iberia to current events on the Anatolian plateau. Yet the fact that he found it necessary to do so suggests that Barth and his fellows knew what they were about.
But even a polemicist as gifted as Hans Barth could not avoid the subject that had, after all, necessitated such wide-ranging religio-historical reflections in the first place: What about that slaughter down in Turkey far away? This brought Barth to his third and considerably more ticklish theme: the Armenians themselves.
First of all, they were tools of John Bull, whose hand could be detected behind all the brouhaha. The charge was tailor-made for the audience of Die Zukunft, whose editor, Maximilian Harden, had made a career out of pillorying the German Foreign Office for insufficient vigilance toward English expansion. This trope, too, had legs. Armenians-as-tools-of-England (later, of the Entente) was soon joined in the turcophile repertoire by a more generalized outcry against "imperialism"-anti-imperialism appealing to the resentments of those who suspected that imperialism might be a great game they had come too late to play.
As for the recent unpleasantness? A "well-deserved 'misfortune,'" Barth assured readers, brought on by the violence of Armenian tax resisters and terrorists. 67 Embarrassed, perhaps, by the discrepancy between these revolutionaries' pitiful efforts at propaganda of the deed and the retaliations wreaked on a whole people, Barth then grasped the nettle of the victims' national character. Armenians, he averred, were impossible not to dislike. In contrast to "The Turkish Peasantry: Core of the Nation" (another chapter title), these guys were usurers who "plundered" their honest, hardworking Muslim neighbors. Pretty flimsy stuff, but its appearance in Die Zukunft showed that serious people took it seriously. And Barth's philippic against the Armenians gained credibility from the fact that it was joining a discourse that had existed before his intervention and would continue long after his own contribution had been forgotten.
This was a discourse that "essentialized" the Christian of the Near East. In one strand, he was the born victim, whose cries for help we have become tired of hearing. "Always beaten, always massacred, incapable of looking a warrior in the face, perpetually offering his throat to the saber": such was the characterization by Ernest Renan (a central figure in Said's indictment of Orientalism) of the "eternal Christian of the Orient," applied approvingly, by Die Zukunft's editor, to the Armenians. 68 As Lepsius observed mordantly, for "a good part of our cultivated society" the dictum of the critic Alphonse Karr was all too true: "Il y a quelqu'un de plus odieux que le bourreau, c'est la victime." 69 67 Barth, Türke, 1. In "Die Türkenhetze," 132, Barth reduced Armenian casualties to "no more than 29,000 Armenians killed," a figure whose offhandedness offered a broad target to Lepsius, no slouch himself at sarcasm. 68 Harden, "Der ächte Kreuzzug," Die Zukunft 4, no. 51, Sept. 19, 1896: 521-25, 524. Cf. Consul Skene in 1860 ("abject" yet "insolent"), quoted in Bilâl N. Ş imşir, ed., British Documents on Ottoman Armenians (Ankara, 1982) 1:xxx (Ş imşir omits positive stereotypes on the same page). Among those uncritically mouthing negative stereotypes was William L. Langer: "One traveler after another was impressed with their [Armenian] cowardice and servility." Conceding the "all too frequent plunderings and massacres," Langer sighs, "So it had been for thousands of years and so it continued. The government was perfectly helpless." The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New York, 1951), 148; see also 151. 69 Lepsius, "Armenier und Türken," 478. At a rally in Paris, Feb. 15, 1903, Francis de Pressensé, deputy for Rhône and president of the League of the Rights of Man, mocked Europeans who reproached Armenians "for having been too moderate, too docile, for having proffered their throats like lambs, for having gone bleating to the slaughterhouse. Ah! Certainly it is easy to be heroic for others while . . . reading the newspaper with your feet on a cushion." Pour l'Arménie, 25.
Cringing (yet insolent), the Armenian-as-victim was of course the flip side of the second strand: the Armenian-as-shyster, who fleeced the Turkish peasant, amassing the entire Ottoman economy into his own sticky hands. 70 Barth himself "proved" the stereotype by trotting out a "proverb" beloved of all self-proclaimed experts on the Orient from London to Petersburg: "One Greek is able to cheat two Jews, but one Armenian can cheat two Greeks." 71 Elements of this discourse had already appeared in the works of orientalists such as Alfred Körte, the archaeologist; Karl Krummbacher, founder of Byzantine studies in Germany; and Hugo Grothe, a geographer who assured readers that not Muslim fanaticism (the explanation of choice among armenophiles) but Armenian exploitation was responsible for the violence. 72 By 1913, Grothe was arguing that Muslim looters were merely reappropriating what Armenians had stolen, an argument ready for retooling after 1933, when he joined the SA. 73 With the sanction of such schol-arship, the discourse of Armenian-as-exploiter made frequent appearances in newspapers close to the government, ready for quoting in other venues. It was also common in Pan-German circles.
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The Left sometimes proved as susceptible as the Right. The democratic Frankfurter Zeitung published lines by the poetess Kassia, in its series "Famous Women in Ancient Greece and Byzantium," that described the Armenians as "quite horrifying people," malicious in low positions, worse when prosperous, and worst of all when they rose to high estate. This "apt" little epigram from the ninth century was billed by the editors as a "contribution to the current debate." It supported, they pointed out helpfully, the "Turkish view in substance, if not in particulars."
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The double-dealing Armenian also turned up in travel articles by Friedrich Naumann, the charismatic Left Liberal leader whose democratic nimbus Liberals in the postwar Federal Republic have been proud to claim for themselves. (It is Naumann's name that graces the research foundation established by the Free Democratic Party in 1958 to support liberal values in scholarship.) In describing an evening spent with German expats in Constantinople, Naumann quoted at length one who, to unanimous accord, justified the massacres as the "self-defense" of honest, upright Turks, a people exploited by the grasping Armenian, who would steal from his own brother, sell his wife and prepubescent daughter, and morally befoul the whole city. 76 Naumann's description was immediately lifted by Karl May, the era's most popular adventure writer. In the Empire of the Silver Lion (1898) quoted Naumann to add force to the novelist's own axiom that the "hawknosed Armenian" was someone who ("speaking generally and on average") could be counted on to have a hand in the game "whenever and wherever in the Orient any kind of vile thing" went down. Since May's previous writings had long made his distaste for Armenians clear, we may wonder who was recycling whom. 77 We recognize these stereotypes, of course, but associate them with other vicOttoman Armenians (Ann Arbor, MI, 1997), 16. On the repackaging of Grothe's "Vorderasienkommittee" as the "Vorderasiengesellschaft" and then as the "Vorderasien Institut," none of which had much substantial reality: Jürgen Kloosterhuis, "Friedliche Imperialisten": Deutsche Auslandsvereine und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 1906 Kulturpolitik, -1918 , 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1994), 1:344, which also uncovers Grothe's membership in the SA. 74 Government outlets are listed in Schulthess' Europäisches Geschichtskalender (Munich, 1896), 275-76. Pan-Germans: Kaiser, Imperialism, 17-18. 75 Frankfurter Zeitung, Oct. 29, 1898, quoted in Nazaret Naltchayan, "Kaiser Wilhelm II's Visits to the Ottoman Empire: Rationale, Reactions, and the Meaning of Images," Armenian Review 42, no. 2/166 (Summer 1989): 47-78, 58.
76 Naumann, "Hinter Konstantinopel," Die Hilfe 4, no. 45 (Nov. 6, 1898): 5-7, 7; the lines appear again in Naumann, "Asia," 31-32. 77 As for the "much-talked-of Armenian disturbances," opined May, "one knows of course how and to what end" they were "staged." Karl May's gesammelte Reiseerzählun-gen, vol. 27, Im Reiche des silbernen Löwen (Freiburg, 1898), 478-79. May's almost verbatim quote of Naumann is noted by Schmuhl, in "Friedrich Naumann und die 'armenische Frage,'" 508, who also quotes Naumann's praise for the Frankfurter Zeitung's turn away from its call for intervention as a sign of "the rethinking process . . . in our democracy." "Politische Notizen," Die Hilfe 6, no. 24 (June 17, 1900): 3.
tims. 78 And we have become so familiar with Edward Said's famous analogy between antisemitism and its "secret sharer," Orientalism (described by him as antisemitism's "Islamic branch"), that we have all but forgotten that these tropes were once used against a Christian people on behalf of a Muslim one. 79 This too was Orientalism. It was also, as Hilmar Kaiser's analysis of the afterlife of these tropes in a certain kind of leftist scholarship has shown, another Socialism of Fools.
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III. EXPLANATIONS
We would be naive to assume that all those who disparaged Armenians or hyped the Turks were acting spontaneously. A half century ago, William L. Langer warned that "we know enough now about the systematic bribery of the French press by the Russians . . . to disabuse us of all exaggerated notions about the value of so-called public opinion." 81 Suborning journalists, leaking "information," subsidizing both invective and accolades were common practices, then as now. In 1914, Russia quietly put the editor of Jeune Turc on its payroll. 82 Young Turks were no less savvy about using the European press. And the sultan, whose experience during the 1870s gave him reason to fear an aroused European public, also did his best, as we have seen, to manipulate it. 83 His ambassadors, required to give a regular accounting of how the press in their respective capitals was reporting Ottoman developments, and fearful that a slender diplomatic pouch might call their diligence into question, likewise planted articles in European organs, in order to have clippings to send home. Germany's ambassador in Constantinople, after initially assuming that only insignificant papers were vulnerable, 78 Cf. Harden: Filled with the "ugliest mercenary spirit [Händlergeist] ," oriental Christians have taken on "all the characteristics European Christians like to ascribe to the scions of Shem [i.e., Jews]." "Der ächte Kreuzzug," 424. Shem: Gen. 9:18-29.
79 Said: "I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of Western anti-Semitism. That anti-Semitism and, as I have discussed it in its Islamic branch, Orientalism, resemble each other very closely is a historical, cultural, and political truth that needs only to be mentioned to an Arab Palestinian for its irony to be perfectly understood." Orientalism (1977; New York, 1979), 27-28, 286-87. 80 In Imperialism, Kaiser has traced a dependency-theory discourse, with exploiters now dressed up social scientifically as "compradors," through footnotes to these same turn-ofthe-century orientalists, geographers, and propagandists. The provenance of "Socialism of Fools," coined in the Habsburg monarchy to characterize antisemitism: Andrew G. 85 Although difficult to prove as a general proposition, the Porte's influence on the German press helps explain why, as Rosa Luxemburg marveled in the bloody autumn of 1895, in some German papers "Turkey was still being portrayed as a utopia where 'the different nationalities have lived next to each other peacefully for centuries'" and any dissatisfaction was the result of European diplomats' "persuading the happy peoples of Turkey that they are oppressed." 86 Nevertheless, armenophile fulminations against Turkey's "lie factory" were a convenient surrogate for an anger that would have been better directed nearer home. As Stoecker surmised, Germany's own authorities had done their best, behind the decent draperies of the Rechtsstaat, to smother the movement for Armenian human rights. Police and provincial governors, the ministers of religious affairs and of the interior, the foreign secretary and the chancellor, Chlodwig Fürst zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst: all intervened to rein in the clergy, prohibit rallies and collections on church property, and deport Armenian speakers. 87 Was this illegitimate? The Protestant church was conceded even by its own members to be under state authority. The press, however, was supposed to be free. True, certain newspapers (offiziöse, in common parlance) lived on government subsidies. One of the duties of an aspiring diplomat was to draft articles destined for such outlets, articles quoted freely by other papers-but with attribution. Such organs were offering the government's take on foreign affairs. They knew it, and their readers knew it. But German readers, enjoying what was probably the most varied press landscape in the world, thought they knew which papers were independent. Few were aware of a system of story laundering whereby material Berlin wanted disseminated was leaked to a newspaper abroad in hopes that enterprising domestic editors would reprint it, citing the foreign journal as an unimpeachable source. And most would have been shocked to learn how far the long arm of the Foreign Office extended into Germany's own liberal democratic press. The savvy Austrian newshound Heinrich Kanner, although certainly not born yesterday, was astounded in 1916 to hear from the lips of a veteran German diplomat that a celebrated columnist at the once fiercely independent Frankfurter Zeitung had been for the past two decades, unbeknownst to his readers (and probably his editors), "actually an official of the Foreign Office," from which he drew a considerable salary. Bribery, of course, was expensive. A cheaper incentive, and perhaps as effective, was "access" to official sources, which the Wilhelmstrasse conferred upon a few privileged journalists.
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Is it government influence that explains why Armenian grievances were systematically downplayed in the German press, while stories hostile to their cause were never officially contradicted? Germany's ambassador to Constantinople in February 1913, in urging a shift of Berlin's Orientpolitik in a direction more friendly to Armenians, conceded as much. For among the corollaries of such a reorientation, he listed a reversal in the Wilhelmstrasse's press policy: the German press would have "to give up its previous rejection of everything Armenian" and adopt "a moderate and understanding attitude" toward Armenian interests. 89 Here was an implicit acknowledgment of just how heavy Berlin's hand had been.
Yet however unsavory their methods, all governments had reason not to want their options limited by public agitation and to mistrust the "answers" offered by 90 The British public, aware of their empire's power, seem less aware that eastern Anatolia, the Armenian heartland, was landlocked and, as Lord Salisbury noted in another context, "We are fish."
91 One must look very hard, at least until 1912, to find anyone wondering how national liberation for Armenians would square with the national aspirations of Turks and Kurds. As for Russia, when Salisbury suggested to Nicholas II that they depose Abdul Hamid if he did not accede to the Great Powers' reforms, the tsar retorted, in an unwonted access of wisdom, that any successor installed by Christian powers would be the target of assassination. And then? "The intolerable burden of pacifying or governing the Turkish empire would be thrown upon the Russians"-an early version of Colin Powell's "Pottery Barn principle": You break it, you own it.
92 Salisbury was similarly checked by his sense that any action of Britain's was "very likely to bring down the Turkish Empire with a run." 93 Thus, while the powers could threaten to put the Ottoman Empire out of its misery, the Ottomans themselves could threaten to die. 94 And lurking in the shadows of any Ottoman demise, statesmen knew, was the specter of communal chaos and a general War of Ottoman Succession that might turn Europe itself into a charnel house. These were dilemmas that England, France, and Russia, with concrete and important stakes already in the region, had to grapple with. Germany, however, whose stake in the Near East was more abstract, did not. Its interest lay in taking advantage of opportunities within the empire and in making sure that, in whatever reconfiguration might follow the empire's unraveling, the resulting balance of power in Europe and the Near East did not shift to its detriment. We should not be surprised that it too preferred the devil it knew to the devil it didn't know.
Still, if it seems clear why the Wilhelmstrasse did its best to push Armenian grievances out of the news, it is less obvious why its efforts did not meet stronger counterpressure from civil society, pulling them back in. Economic interests are not the culprit: as late as 1914, German investment in the Ottoman Empire was still only a quarter of that of the British and French. 95 Our temptation is to reach for "political culture," the historians' eject button, its red light blinking "Hit me!" when all else fails. With a closer look at the protagonists, however, perhaps we can avoid a bailout.
Some of the explanation for the German difference surely lies in the depth of Germany's confessional antagonisms. In England and America the humanitarian coalition that evangelicals had forged around antislavery in the first half of the nineteeth century proved sturdy enough to incorporate Unitarian, Jewish, and freethinking elites around the cause of Armenian Christians by its end. In France, for all the battles between republicans and Catholics at home, anticlericalism stopped at the water's edge. 96 But in Germany, where the religious Other played a far more central role in the construction of identities, so leery were secular intellectuals and Jews of the endeavors of the pious that even a whiff of "clerical politics" could prove toxic. As C. H. Becker remarked to a fellow orientalist, for many people "the very appearance of a mission man [at a meeting] is a red rag." 97 As for Christians themselves, mutual suspicion between Protestants and Catholics structured all their relationships. 98 Whether or not the armenophile movement can be convicted of antisemitism, there can be little doubt of its automatic, almost programmatic anti-Catholicism, Lepsius not excepted. Martin Rade, his ally in publicizing the Armenian plight, a man who would break a lance for the Jews of Russia in 1905 and for the Muslims of Bulgaria in 1913, was a founding member of the militant Protestant League (Evangelischer Bund), one of Germany's largest mass organizations, whose mission, in the words of one of its leaders (himself passionately engaged on the Armenians' behalf), was to "break the power of Rome on German soil." 99 Protestant League gatherings, along with those of the equally anti-Catholic Gustav-Adolf Association, provided important venues for soliciting support for Armenian human rights. Could such gatherings have sought Catholic participation in a broad armenophile coalition? And if they had, would they have succeeded? The coverage of Pastor Lepsius's biggest rally in Berlin by the city's Catholic daily, normally sympathetic to Armenians, suggests not. It relegated the rally to a single paragraph on a back page (right below an account of a local chess champion) and devoted half of that paragraph to reprinting the negative commentary of an offiziöse organ. 100 In such an environment, the very narratives that encouraged some Germans to identify with distant sufferers, recognizing them as "neighbors," implicitly marked as "Other" the rest of their countrymen, erecting impassable barriers to coalition building.
Moreover, susceptibility to the turcophile narrative owed much, especially after the turn of the century, to the perception that Germans themselves had a future in the Orient. Associations to further the study of Islam, encourage GermanTurkish cultural exchange, facilitate tourism and investment in Anatolia vied for members with even more ambitious organizations aimed at financing clinics along the Baghdad railway and founding a university in Constantinople. 101 With most of the globe carved up by the other powers, what sunnier spot for German energies than down in Turkey far away, where they might flourish at the invitation of the Ottoman government-so long, at least, as it remained independent? The German Empire's increasingly manifest destiny as bulwark of Islam against the imperialist rapacity of the Entente, a favorite theme among public intellectuals, contributed to the sense of German proprietorship in an Anatolian place in the sun.
That sense of proprietorship was important. The point of turcophile propaganda all along had been not only to ward off European intervention, nor even to purvey hopes of a radiant Ottoman spring made glorious summer by the sun of German investment, but also to encourage Germans to identify with Turkish power. In this, it succeeded. As early as the 1890s, if we can believe the novelist Theodor Fontane, it was fashionable among Berlin heads of households to wear a fez in the family circle. 102 By 1900, the Byzantinist Heinrich Gelzer was marveling that "it is now the 'in' thing to enthuse over the Turks, and anyone who doesn't automatically go along with this fashion is considered narrow-minded and a person with backward views." 103 Even the Adana pogrom of 1909, which took another 20,000 Armenian lives, did not dampen enthusiasm for the New Turkey's allegedly rising crescent. 104 In 1911, the liberal journalist Ernst Jäckh, well connected with progressive intellectual and business circles and now embarking on a career in promoting the New Turkey, ushered a convoy of Ottoman dignitaries on an informational junket through Germany in the service of closer relations. Everywhere, he reported, that East met West and the "representatives of the New Turkey" came into contact with the "neudeutschen Volk," they both experienced a shock of recognition. Jäckh quoted an Ottoman visitor to the effect that if some catastrophe destroyed European civilization, leaving "only the German type," it would be possible to recreate "all of Europe" from that alone. His German hosts, in return for being credited with what amounted to the DNA of Western civilization, reportedly expressed similar delight: "That's what the Turks are like? So cultivated and clever, so imposing and simpatico, so European, ja-so German!" 105 Praise for Turks meant praise for Germans. 106 The hosannas reached their height, of course, during the Great War, when a military alliance provided additional reasons for seeking Self in the Other. At the very moment when Turks were marching Armenians to their deaths, Jäckh (a self-described "Zivil-Apostel," who ended his career as Carnegie Professor of International Relations at Columbia) edited a series of pamphlets extolling Turkey's genocidal leadership and writing articles with such titles as "Ex Oriente Lux." 107 
IV. EASTS AND WESTS
Was it wise for the Armenian cause in Germany to become so closely associated with the particular vision of Bible Christians and their narratives of martyrdom rather than with more universal discourses, such as the rights of man? Probably not. But Lepsius's efforts to mobilize a movement that would encompass every confessional and political current went nowhere. Anticipating by more than half a century Hannah Arendt's observations about the weakness of the category "humanity" as a basis for obligation, he remarked bitterly, "Humanity on this occasion has failed in Germany-indeed, has failed completely. . . . Not one man, who wasn't from Christian circles, has come to any of our rallies." 108 Lepsius exaggerated. But not by much.
We should not be surprised. Human rights take their color and their shape from the vessels into which they are poured. As Lepsius's movement and reactions to it demonstrate, the question "who is my neighbor?" is inevitably a question about oneself and a question about the Other, a question of identification and rejection, of affection and distance. Toward people who are really far away, one can be indifferent; but the closer the distant sufferer is brought to home, the more the discussion of his "human" rights gets drawn into older debates and established identities, and the more it becomes a colloquy among people whose own narratives shape and color these conversations. As Americans saw during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, for some of us the Bosnians were "Czechs" (1938); for others, "Jews" (1941); for still others, "Nazi collaborators" (1941-45).
Thus, human rights campaigns-as Michael Ignatieff has lately reminded usare always campaigns for particular humans, even when advocates speak the language of universality: "Everyone's universalism ultimately anchors itself in a particuliar commitment to a specifically important group of people whose cause is close to one's heart or conviction." Although NGOs claim to be an "antipolitics," Ignatieff argues, "in practice" their activism "means taking sides and mobilizing constituencies powerful enough to force abusers to stop. As a consequence, effective human rights activism is bound to be partial and political." Nor is it surprising that when interventions grow out of these campaigns, the demand for "human rights is increasingly seen" by the targets of such interventions "as the language of moral imperialism." 109 Ignatieff is speaking of the past two decades, but his words would have applied as well a century ago. Lepsius himself rejected the charge of a double standard, offering to support any relief effort Hans Barth cared to organize for suffering Turks. The issue, he insisted, was not whether one preferred Armenians to Turks or vice versa. Rather, "the butchers have a priori my antipathy; the victims, however I might otherwise think of their value, have my sympathy." 110 But Lepsius failed to acknowledge that conflicts are often between victims. As historians know, the fall of empires, however tyrannical, and the founding of new nation-states-Greece, Bulgaria, Ireland, Czechoslovakia, Israel, Croatia, and, after 1988, the republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia-inevitably create minorities who become new victims. 111 And when victims are in conflict, human rights movements are in competition. 112 Ignatieff did not cite Hegel's commentary on Antigone, but he might have: a tragedy is not the conflict between Good and Evil, but between Good and Good.
The war that ended the Armenian Question so murderously ended the Eastern Question as well. It marked the transformation of the state system from one that still had a place for empires, with their fuzzy frontiers and mixed but unmixable populations, to one based on nation-states, with hard (though disputed) borders and aspirations to a homogenous population. This transformation lit the fuse for even worse explosions. It also meant the relinquishing of a part of Europe's own heritage: the Near East, once called "the Orient." 113 
